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## «Геополитическая геометрия» в трудах Е.М. Примакова

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**Аннотация.** По мнению ведущих российских аналитиков, профессиональная деятельность Е.М. Примакова на важнейших государственных постах является эталонной для последующих поколений политиков и дипломатов. Но не менее интересен его опыт научного описания и анализа текущих политических событий, реальным участником которых он сам был. В этом он раскрывается перед нами не только как выдающийся политик своего времени, но и как самостоятельно мыслящий ученый, оставивший после себя серьезное научное наследие. И хотя отдельно взятой геополитической теории у него мы не находим, но к теме геополитики Евгений Максимович на страницах своих произведений постоянно возвращается и из этих фрагментов складывается весьма цельное видение геополитической проблемы, получившей в дальнейшем название «доктрины Примакова». Раскрытию основных моментов этой доктрины и посвящена настоящая работа. В творческом наследии Е.М. Примакова отражены две важные темы международных отношений – роль политических элит и их лидеров в принятии ответственных решений и практическое осуществление геополитических стратегий ведущих держав мира. Особое внимание им уделяется России и проблеме возвращению ее в число ведущих мировых держав. В настоящей работе рассматривается вопрос геополитических конструкций, нашедших свое отражение в научных трудах Е.М. Примакова. Такие конструкции напоминают собой геометрические фигуры, поэтому и получили у нас соответствующее название. Оставляя в стороне анализ многочисленных научных публикаций, характеризующих и оценивающих научное наследие Примакова, мы сосредоточим свое внимание непосредственно на самом тексте Евгения Максимовича, в котором нашло отражение его политическое мировоззрение и профессиональное мышление.

**Ключевые слова:** геополитика, элиты, международные отношения, «доктрина Примакова», гегемония, сверхдержава, мировое лидерство, конфликты

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Research article

## “Geopolitical Geometry” in the Works of E.M. Primakov

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**Abstract.** According to leading Russian analysts, the professional activity of E.M. Primakov in the most important government posts is a benchmark for subsequent generations of politicians and diplomats. But no less interesting is his experience of scientific description and analysis of current political events, in which he himself was a real participant. In this, he reveals himself to us not only as an outstanding politician of his time, but also as an independently thinking scientist who left behind a serious scientific legacy. And although we do not find a separate geopolitical theory in his works, Yevgeny Maksimovich constantly returns to the topic of geopolitics on the pages of his works, and from these fragments a very holistic vision of the geopolitical problem is formed, which later received the name "Primakov's doctrine". The present work is devoted to the disclosure of the main points of this doctrine. In the creative heritage of E.M. Primakov, two important topics of international relations are reflected - the role of political elites and their leaders in making responsible decisions and the practical implementation of geopolitical strategies of the leading powers of the world. He pays special attention to Russia and the problem of its return to the ranks of leading world powers. This work examines the issue of geopolitical structures reflected in the scientific works of E.M. Primakov. Such structures resemble geometric figures, which is why they received the corresponding name. Leaving aside the analysis of numerous scientific publications characterizing and evaluating Primakov's scientific legacy, we will focus our attention directly on the text of Yevgeny Maksimovich, which reflects his political worldview and professional thinking.

**Keywords:** geopolitics, elites, international relations, "Primakov doctrine", hegemony, superpower, world leadership, conflicts

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**Introduction.** Evgeny Maksimovich Primakov (1929 – 2015) went down in Russian history both as one of the most successful political figures of the Yeltsin liberal reform era (the “dashing nineties”) and as a well-known Russian social scientist who left behind a very extensive scientific legacy. He is both our history and our modern times. Moreover, E.M. Primakov was perhaps the only politician of the “dashing nineties” about whom we cannot say anything bad. And this in itself means a lot – he is still one of the most respected Russian prime ministers... The scientific work of Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences E.M. Primakov is of even greater interest to us. Especially his geopolitical views.

In the 1990s, when he was forming his geopolitical concept (the Primakov Doctrine), the Russian elites were not yet ready to adequately perceive it and were under the influence of American geopolitical constructs (Z. Brzezinski and Co. <sup>1</sup>). The realization of this came to the politicians of the next generation, who already in the 2000s began to implement the plan for the revival of Russia. Therefore, in general, Primakov's geopolitical ideas can be assessed as "revivalist" (in American terminology - "revanchist"). They have not lost their relevance to the present day, serving as a reliable theoretical basis for the formation of a modern geopolitical picture of the world. In this regard, the main goal of this work is to reveal the substantive part of the "Primakov Doctrine" as the basis of his geopolitical concept. Therefore, the present study is faced with the task of providing an analysis of the main works of Yevgeny Maksimovich, containing his geopolitical conclusions.

**Materials and research methods.** Based on the above-stated relevance, the object of this work is the creative legacy of E.M. Primakov, and the subject is his geopolitical analysis of contemporary international relations and, in particular, the position of Russia and its return to the club of great world powers.

This study is based on the analysis of the works of E.M. Primakov, devoted to the issues of international relations, geopolitics and the analysis of political elites and their leaders. In this regard, we focused on methods that form a kind of methodological triad: *dialectics*, *hermeneutics*, *comparative studies* + *semiotics*. If dialectics allows us to evaluate the problem under consideration as a whole and in its immediate development, then hermeneutics allows us to look deep into the text itself and reveal its meanings; comparative studies make it possible to compare

individual positions with analogues, and semiotics to identify existing symbols and images associated with the interpretation of schemes and models of geopolitical strategies. The complex of these methods allows us to approach an adequate understanding of the geopolitical legacy of E.M. Primakov.

In this case, the study of the methods and techniques of the academician's own scientific work is of fundamental importance. Contemporaries note that his approach to the matter was to carefully study and creatively use the rich experience of others who had succeeded in one or another political matter [8, p. 406]. This was an approach that put morality first, rather than utilitarian political benefits. And in our own assessments, we must proceed precisely from this fundamental principle, without which our understanding of this author will not be entirely adequate.

**Research results and their discussion. Reading E.M. Primakov.** Getting to know the political science legacy of Yevgeny Maksimovich leads the reader to a whole series of reflections that allow him to significantly adjust modern assessments of international relations and geopolitical strategies. As an author, Primakov constantly reflects on what he writes. He saw the meaning of the scientist's work not in the task of rewriting history for himself, but in its objective comprehension [15, pp. 16-29]. As a participant in many political events, he has experience in their responsible assessment and the right to their independent interpretation. He sometimes had to make very difficult and responsible decisions. Primakov himself commented on his "loop" over the Atlantic as a result of the most complex international relations between Russia and the United States [12 p. 211]. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V. Lavrov, "his entire life is evidence of consistent defense of national interests, selfless work, imbued with true patriotism and selfless service to the Fatherland" [7, p. 222]. In turn, E.M. Primakov himself bowed before the authority of A.A. Gromyko and always highly valued his professional activities [11, p. 243].

For us, it is obvious that the sum of all his works is evidence that we have before us an excellent writer and political analyst [19. 20, 24]. A distinctive feature of the political behavior of E.M. Primakov was that his words did not diverge from his deeds. [6] He did not like it when the absence of this rule was revealed in the actions of his colleagues (when, for example, they are democrats in words, but in practice supporters of an authoritarian style of leadership) [9, Vol. 9, p. 124]. E.M. Primakov refuted the common assertion about the impossibility of making big politics in white gloves. He proved that this is not only acceptable, but also necessary for people who occupy the highest government posts [7, p. 477].

Primakov's strategic thought planned a new geopolitical geometry, which was realized years later [19-21]. He was one of the few who launched the ideas of a new imperial Russian project, the beginning of the implementation of which he managed to witness during his lifetime. [22,23, 25].

First of all, it is necessary to note the role of E.M. Primakov as a *chronicler of international relations* of his time. "A look at history shows that the development of humanity did not proceed through the triumph of one world civilization over another, but rather through their coexistence, which did not at all imply, and does not currently imply, their parallel development, but only mutual influence, interaction." [9, p. 332]

In his monographs "The History of a Conspiracy: US Middle East Policy in the 1970s – Early 1980s" (1985) [10, pp.15-400] and "The War That Could Have Been Avoided" (1991) [10, pp.401-565], Yevgeny Maksimovich meticulously reconstructs not only the course of political events that unfolded in the Middle East, but also provides a deep, comprehensive scientific analysis of them (he will adhere to this principle in his other works). He acts as a chronicler and analyst of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the world's leading powers (the USA and the USSR) were involved. At the same time, the author constantly notes the role of political leaders and their elites in shaping strategies and implementing them [10, pp.47-55]. His knowledge and competence allow him to look deep into events and reveal their very essence.

**Geopolitical views of E.M. Primakov.** E.M. Primakov began his work as head of the Russian Foreign Ministry in conditions when Russia, in the opinion of the authors of liberal reforms, suffered defeat in the Cold War and the country was in "post-war devastation". The "defeatist line" in domestic and foreign policy then threw Russia back into the ranks of third world countries [11, p. 247]. It was precisely at overcoming this crisis that all of E.M. Primakov's scientific thought was directed.

We have noticed that Primakov's geopolitical constructions act as conclusions of his historical and political works. Therefore, his geopolitical geometry is based on his political practices, and is not of an abstract academic nature, but of an applied nature. And the texts of his works clearly illustrate this assertion.

All currently existing geopolitical doctrines can be divided by their nature into two large groups: 1) those based on a scientific understanding of the essence of international relations (by their nature they are close to more exact sciences) and 2) those based on metaphysical doctrinal principles (over time they are capable of turning into a mythological geopolitics, completely divorced from reality). We characterize Primakov's geopolitical views as "political geometry", since he sought to create a practical model of an applied nature.

An analysis of the works of E.M. Primakov allows us to clarify the concept of alternating geopolitical actualization of regions, according to which at different times those regions come forward in which the international interests of the world's leading countries collide most acutely and strongly. As a result, their geopolitical ideological centers formulate concepts that are advantageous for each of the parties, which not only substantiate the nature and strategy of behavior, but also justify their actions in advance. The region of Greater Eurasia, which constantly attracts the national interests of the world's leading powers, has constant relevance.

Geopolitical geometry manifests itself in the timely and accurate detection and analysis of threats of new dividing lines [11, p. 254]. In geopolitics, new combinations of positions constantly arise that require clarification and change in international relations. These combinations are easily described using geometry, clearly demonstrating the balance of power in the international arena. Another principle of his vision of international relations was the principle of internal pluralism (democracy) and external one-man management. Primakov allowed for internal political pluralism, but insisted that Russia's positions in foreign policy should only meet its national interests. "I am deeply convinced that Russia's foreign policy should be national, based on the agreement of various political forces, not participate in their struggle, and protect the values that are dear to the entire society" [11, p. 256].

Evgeny Maksimovich formulates the principle of "absence of a political vacuum" in foreign policy, characterizing it with the well-known proverb: "a holy place is never empty." He admits that Russia's withdrawal from the leading positions in the world in the 1990s led to the collapse of the bipolar system. "It is difficult to believe that, having withdrawn from active foreign policy, Russia will retain the opportunity to return to it in the same capacity as a great power, without losing its potential, without surrendering its hard-won positions in the international arena. Foreign policy does not tolerate a "vacuum." The emptiness that arises after the withdrawal of a state from the leading roles is soon filled by another or others" [11, p. 252]. Russia is needed in world foreign policy to maintain the balance of power, as a counterweight to the United States.

One of the points of tension between Russia and the West is the difference in understanding the essence of democracy. "A number of Western leaders believe," noted E.M. Primakov in this regard, "that our country can be considered democratic if the American model of democracy is established in it, or, despite all its differences with the American model, the Western European model of democracy" [14, p. 599]. Pointing to Russia's special path, Yevgeny Maksimovich noted that it "is moving toward universal values, such as democracy, in its own way, taking into account traditions, history, the multinational nature of the state, and its geographical location" [14, p. 599]. It is precisely Russia's special path that underlies the so-called "Primakov Doctrine."

Primakov tries to find a reasonable compromise between the formula of self-determination of nationalities and the preservation of the integrity of the state [12, p. 331]. In the modern world, this conflict is becoming the main one. To this is added the conflict of civilizations described by S. Huntington. According to Primakov, "the division of the world according to the religious-civilizational principle will have an extremely negative impact on the stability of interstate and intrastate relations. Along with this, the formation and development of a world civilization capable of absorbing all the best features of the various civilizations of today's world will be hampered" [12, 331-332].

By common admission of Russian politicians, the geopolitical principles formulated by E.M. Primakov currently form the basis of their foreign policy.

**"The Primakov Doctrine".** According to S.V. Lavrov, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia (1996-1998), E.M. Primakov adhered to political principles that later became known as the "Primakov Doctrine". "With his arrival at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a turning point in foreign policy occurred - it left the rut that our Western partners tried to drive it into after the collapse of the USSR, and got on its own track... His arrival at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it possible to stabilize foreign policy, to give it stability and independence" [5]. The West took an extremely negative view of this doctrine, which in fact marked Russia's transition from Atlanticism to a course toward a multi-vector foreign policy [2].

The essence of the "*Primakov doctrine*" is to squeeze "the maximum benefit for one's country out of absolutely any situation" [7, p. 480]. But this must be done taking into account the interests of partners, "taking into account the full balance of power in a given region and doing everything possible to maintain the parity of interests of the world's leading players. Primakov knew that a great deal can be achieved through concessions and compromise" [7, p. 480]. Thus, the "Primakov doctrine" became a kind of overcoming of the "defeatist line" in Russia's foreign policy, which he himself repeatedly pointed out in a number of his works [11, pp. 247-250].

The United States behaves completely differently. In one of his works ("The History of a Conspiracy: The Middle East Policy of the United States in the 1970s – Early 1980s," 1985), E.M. Primakov noted that "policy can produce a stable result only if it is based on realities: on a correct understanding of the balance of power, its dynamics, objective needs and objective national interests of various societies. US policy in the Middle East was and is still based on a subjective basis..." [10, p. 397].

Primakov consistently reveals the mechanisms of the behind-the-scenes policy of the USA and Israel in the Middle East, drawing attention to the policy of double standards and manipulation [10, p. 369]. In his opinion, the USA constantly organizes provocations and "twists the arms" of obstinate allies and potential enemies [10, p. 374]. At the same time, the USA itself always overestimates its strength and underestimates the forces of resistance to its imperial policy [10, p. 384]. The States do not take into account anyone's interests except their own, therefore, when they suffer defeats, they always level out these losses by starting the next international adventures [10, p. 387].

**Superpower (the problem of world leadership)**. Those countries that are in the leading roles in the world club have the following characteristics of their chosen status: objectively accumulated political influence, a special geopolitical position, potential economic opportunities, highly advanced military technologies, enormous intellectual and scientific-technical potential. In order to have a multi-vector foreign policy, Russia must have all these qualities [11, p. 253].

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia ceased to exist as a superpower and a "defeatist line" was established in its foreign policy. "Formally, a situation arose," notes Primakov, "in which we can say that there is only one superpower left on the international arena. But only formally. It should be clearly understood that the very concept of "superpower" was an attribute of the Cold War. No one can argue against the fact that in the post-confrontation period, the United States is the most powerful state in military, economic and financial terms. But it is not a power that, as in the previous period, is called upon to lead or subordinate others" [11, p. 247]. He is against identifying the power of the United States "with the only center in the world order, around and at

the behest of which all more or less significant processes and events on the international arena are formed" [11, p. 247]. A multipolar world began to take shape already at the end of the Cold War, in the form of uneven economic development of various parts of the globe.

In his biographical book *Years in Big Politics* (1999), Primakov notes that the policies of many of Moscow's allies, who closely monitored all changes in the Kremlin's power structures, depended on Russia's power and activity in the international arena [11, p. 228]. With the collapse of the USSR, Russia found itself in the role of a second-rate state in the so-called "civilized world" [11, pp. 245-246]. But the West itself was initially against rapprochement with Russia and did not want to see it as an equal partner, since it considered it merely its "client" [11, p. 250].

A superpower has full sovereignty, freedom of action and is the center of attraction of geopolitical force. Giving his understanding of the concept of "superpower", Primakov notes that it is a category of the "cold war". "The distinctive feature of such a state cannot be only economic, military and other advantages. A superpower must fulfill the function of ensuring the security of an entire group of countries. Moreover, during a period when there is a real and common threat to them. Naturally, a superpower becomes the leader of this group, dictates its will to it, commands it. This was the Soviet Union. This was also the United States. Now the conditions have changed" [12, p. 290]. In his opinion, at the beginning of the 21st century, not a single superpower remained in the world - the Soviet Union was gone, and the United States ceased to be a superpower.

The United States asserts its geopolitical position by weakening the positions of its strategic competitors [10, p. 49]. They know how to "twist the arms" of their negotiating partners and persistently promote their national interests [12, p. 325]. The United States hinders the processes leading to a multipolar world order by leveling the role of the UN and asserting the practice of unilateral forceful actions. A unipolar world increases confrontation in international relations, since it is deprived of a balance of power. A unipolar world order (American centrism) is beneficial to only one country – the United States itself. Therefore, their main goal is to eliminate all those who can lay claim to the role of system-forming centers on the world stage [12, pp. 445-446]. E.M. Primakov was against the United States being able to act "at its own discretion against any country... It is precisely this approach that leads to general destabilization" [8, p. 339].

Speaking about the emerging new world "power centers", he first of all named China, which is rapidly developing at the beginning of the 21st century. He does not exclude the possibility of a global confrontation, which will be based on geopolitical reasons. He hoped that globalism (which establishes numerous connections) reduces the risk of such a conflict. Active players in the international arena will seek various security configurations. And in these conditions, the role of Russia increases: "Without the participation of a strong Russia," Primakov notes, "this process will not be effective. We are talking specifically about a strong Russia. A weak country, torn apart by internal conflicts and at the same time possessing a huge nuclear arsenal, is an element of instability and unpredictability. Such a Russia contradicts the interests of not only its population, but also the world community" [12, p. 295].

Primakov believes that a superpower unites a conglomerate of states around itself, ensuring their security and dictating the "rules of the game" to them. The prevailing trends indicate that the world is moving not toward a unipolar but toward a multipolar order [12, pp. 436-438].

**Fundamentals of Applied Geopolitics: National Interests** . Classical geopolitics is understood as the highest strategy that determines the location of each country in the world, its capabilities, ambitions, behavioral and development goals [3, p. 43 ]. Primakov's main opponent was Z. Brzezinski [1], whose popularity in Russia in the 1990s negatively affected the geopolitical thinking of the local political and political science community. The basis of applied geopolitics lies precisely in the direct impact on the political thinking of the ruling elites and their leaders. According to Primakov, the geopolitical positions of leading states are in constant motion – they are refined and changed depending on the current international situation. "At various stages of Russia's development, the emphasis in its foreign policy activities shifted..." [16, p. 169].

As an orientalist, Evgeny Maksimovich pays great attention to the analysis of political processes in Eurasia and in particular the Middle East, which he considers a kind of "litmus test" for all international relations. In his opinion, the Middle East region conceals many different traps and pitfalls, secret political springs and failed alliances. Many leading countries and politicians have fallen into the trap of the Middle East [13, p. 199; 429].

The political history of the Middle East is a "cascade of wars," which determines the mentality of the ruling elites and their leaders; it is a fragile state of equilibrium and a constant state of "neither war nor peace" [11, p. 427]. The Middle East whirlpool has destroyed many ambitious politicians [11, p. 431]. Indeed, the most important factor in the instability of political systems is their elites, demonstrating serious professional incompetence. [See: 12; 15].

Primakov describes international relations in the Middle East in terms of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, using the term "game." He notes that virtually all Middle Eastern leaders were well aware of the rules and goals of this game and hoped that "someday its contours would become known to history" [11, p. 435]. He acknowledges that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not so much an ideological rivalry as a geopolitical rivalry between the world's leading powers [11, p. 432].

It was he who came up with the concept of RIC (Russia, India, China), which should more closely coordinate their actions in protecting their interests [12, p. 296]. This geopolitical project remains very promising at the present time, especially considering that both China and India are gradually becoming new world centers of power.

Primakov repeatedly emphasizes that Russia has always sought to resolve conflicts peacefully and has never changed its defensive doctrine. The Kremlin preferred negotiations and constructive agreements to war. "Unfortunately," the diplomat states, "our advice and recommendations have not always been accepted by Western partners," and adds: "...one cannot approach individual nations or their leaders with biased standards" [11, p. 213].

Describing public diplomacy, Primakov always emphasizes the role of "hidden springs" and behind-the-scenes mechanisms that influence the nature of power [16, p. 273]. He characterizes this area of informal relations as the sphere of interpersonal contacts, in which he himself had experience and often used personal contacts to build official relations [9, p. 115; 13, p. 54]. As a negotiator, Yevgeny Maksimovich could, without exaggeration, "sort out" any situation. He "knew how to communicate "on equal terms" with representatives of the West, and his opinion was listened to... The principles of today's Russian foreign policy were largely laid down by E.M. Primakov" [7, p. 299].

Primakov pays special attention to the analysis of the quality of the subjects of the political elites of his time. In the foreign policy practice of the 1990s, he identifies at least three approaches that existed at the highest echelons of power at that time: 1) supporters of the Atlantic alliance - demanding rapprochement at any cost with the "civilized West", asserting the non-alternative nature of this approach; 2) those who claimed that "Russia is generally not capable of an active foreign policy" and advocated for the rejection of such a policy, proposing to focus exclusively on solving internal Russian problems and, 3) finally, those who claimed that "Russia can and should strive for equal partnership relations with everyone, seek and find fields of coinciding interests, "plow" such fields with others" [11, pp. 251-252]. Yevgeny Maksimovich adhered to the last approach, rightly believing that it would be difficult for Russia to maintain its territorial integrity without a balanced foreign policy. "Russia is far from indifferent to how and in what capacity, having opened up its economy, it will enter the world economy – as a discriminated raw materials appendage or as its equal participant" [11, p. 252].

Primakov particularly emphasizes that "the formula that the overwhelming majority of states have been guided by and continue to be guided by to this day was not invented today and we are not the authors: there are no permanent allies, but there are permanent national interests. In the Soviet period, we often deviated from this vital truth, and as a result, in such cases, the national interests of our state were sacrificed to the fight against "permanent adversaries" or support for "permanent allies"" [11, p. 251]. At the end of the 1990s, Russia had to change the rules of its

behavior and seriously think about its national interests. And above all, to put an end to the West's policy of "driving wedges" into its relations with the CIS countries.

He did not like it when the Russian Foreign Ministry worked in a "response mode" [8, p. 367]. This gave Russia's rivals the opportunity to shape the agenda of international relations themselves. In such conditions, Russia was constantly catching up. Ideally, everyone else should catch up. And to do this, it is necessary to seize the initiative.

One of the main problems of the geopolitical views of E.M. Primakov was the claim for Russia's return to the ranks of leading world players. According to his idea, such a return of Russia to the ranks of world leaders had to take place through overcoming the dependence of power on oligarchic capitalism [14, pp. 567-570]. Such a return meant, first of all, the return of Russia to its subjectivity. The modern world, according to his general assessment, is a time when many have lost their political subjectivity. And this is a global challenge for many countries of the world.

**The concept of multi-vector policy and the problem of subjectivity in geopolitics.** The international space resembles the periodic table of elements of D. Mendeleev - in which all states are located in a certain order, depending on their military-economic power and geopolitical tasks. But the most important factor influencing their location is whether they are subjects or objects of geopolitics?

Primakov considered the accusations against Russia that it uses energy resources as a political instrument of its foreign policy to be frivolous [16, p. 170]. He considered this to be a speculative sphere of the foreign policy strategy of the collective West. At the same time, Primakov noted that the West was accustomed to allowing certain liberties with Moscow and not keeping the promises it made [17, p. 155]. And he saw in this, among other things, the fault of the Russian political leadership itself. On the other hand, such speculative statements point to the problem of the subjectivity of their authors themselves, who exhibit a deficit (crisis) in the political argumentation of their claims to power.

According to the generally accepted tradition, the subjects of geopolitics are considered to be states, more specifically the ruling political elites and their national leaders. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite one statement by A.G. Dugin: "Geopolitics is the worldview of power, the science of power and for power. Only as a person approaches the social elite does geopolitics begin to reveal its significance, its meaning and its benefit for him, whereas before that it was perceived as an abstraction" [4, p. 13].

According to E.M. Primakov, the conflict in the Middle East has such a protracted phase of its development because the states located there have not been able to resolve the issue of their sovereignty positively and in their favor. At the same time, the visible framework of the power structure itself has very often been subjected to severe deformation and even complete demolition [13, p. 437, 550-506, etc.].

As mentioned above, it was E.M. Primakov who was one of the developers of the concept of multi-vector foreign policy of Russia. In his opinion, multi-vector policy of Russia is based on the unwillingness of the majority of states to agree with the world order determined by one power [11, p.253]. Political subjectivity is manifested in the absence of the need to borrow (let alone copy) other people's standards and experience. Unfortunately, Primakov calls the 1990s a time of blind copying of Western policy standards. After the collapse of the world colonial system, many political leaders of the "young states" actively copied the behavioral styles of politicians of the leading countries of the world and their standard of living known to them [9, p.94]. Russia was no exception. Although the fashion for everything Western here passed very quickly.

According to current Russian politicians, the emergence of the concept of a multipolar world is associated with E.M. Primakov. "This idea became more than just a beautiful geopolitical theory. Primakov consistently applied it in everyday practical work, especially when it came to giving Russia's foreign policy a multi-vector nature, and activating the search for allies in the East and other regions of the world" [7, pp. 26-27]. However, it should be added that multi-vector nature



must be provided by the country's internal resources. In other words, not every country that declares its multi-vector nature can put these words into practice. As recent political history shows, countries such as Azerbaijan and Belarus have successfully failed their multi-vector nature policies, precisely because they lack the necessary national resources.

Russia has enough of its own resources in this sense. But the main task of the Russian authorities is to find a reasonable use of this power. "A strong Russia today should not be associated with a threat to stability in the world," Primakov notes. "Only inertia of thinking or underestimation of the multi-layered Russian reality, misunderstanding of the real change in the balance of power in the country can lead to the conclusion about the danger emanating from Russia... An adequate perception of Russia is an important element in mobilizing all possibilities for solving universal problems in our troubled world" [12, p. 295]. Unfortunately, the official Kremlin does not always manage to find and implement the optimal version of the algorithm of its foreign policy actions. But Primakov hoped that in the future Russia would have more opportunities and, most importantly, political will to implement an independent path of development.

**Conclusion.** The analysis of the works of E.M. Primakov shows that he has no special work on geopolitics, but this theme runs through almost all of his works. In each of his works on international relations, we constantly come across individual authorial thoughts and conclusions related to geopolitical topics. And it is from these seemingly disparate remarks that his geopolitical worldview principles are built, some of which we have presented in this work.

In the conditions of the "dashing nineties" Primakov's geopolitical ideas looked like "revivalist" (aimed at returning Russia to its former leadership status). In fact, they were. At present, many statements by American political scientists (G. Kissinger, F. Fukuyama, etc.) and politicians also look like "revanchist": the slogan of Trumpism "Make America great again" testifies to the fact that part of the American political elite has recognized the existing problems and has embarked on the path of systemic reconstruction of its former greatness.

What does the creative legacy of E.M. Primakov mean to us today? Is it still relevant to us? Undoubtedly, unlike Z. Brzezinski, whose geopolitical mythologemes are already hopelessly outdated and consigned to the archives of the history of geopolitics, the "Primakov doctrine" is a political map of Russia's movement in the modern multipolar world (as evidenced by the recognition of current Russian diplomats) [See: 7-8]. At the same time, we need not only that Primakov's works could be read and adequately understood, but also that they be used in practice as politically significant guidelines that ensure Russia's stable sovereignty. In this regard, we can confidently say that in the future, interest in domestic authors who developed geopolitical geometry (A.E. Vandamme, A.S. Panarin, etc.) will only increase. And the name of Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov stands first in a series of these research projects...

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